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Introduction 
In Retrospect 
We wrote the first of our works included in this book as Op Eds for the Philadelphia Inquirer and the International Herald Tribune in 1997. That year of our beginning marked the cresting of an era 
that had begun in the concluding days of the Cold War and that was uniquely 
both democratic and internationalist. 
Its democratic character was made manifest by widespread regime 
change. From Eastern Europe to Asia and Africa authoritarian governments 
yielded to new democratic ones. Though many of the democracies born of 
this era were deeply flawed and some have not stood the test of time, they 
commonly represented the hope of the day that history was on the side of 
greater freedom. 
The era's internationalist character was made manifest as well by a boom 
in the building of international organizations. Though the balance of the 
boom's affects on social and economic justice as well as the environment has 
been mixed, it too represented the spirit of the times, and in doing so trans-
formed the global institutional skyline. To name but a few of the period's 
significant institutional developments, the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 gave 
birth to the European Union. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
came into force in 1994. The World Trade Organization was established in 
1995, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted in 
Rome in the summer of 1998. 
These two great post-Cold War trends of democratization and interna-
tionalism came together in the emergence of what has come to be called the 
global democracy movement. Citizen organizations, no longer content to 
limit their political participation to the domestic arena, came of age in the 
1990's as a global political force. Many human rights and environmental 
organizations, in particular, came to playa role that was different from, but 
at least equal in influence to, that of many states and international organiza-
tions. As part of their emergence, civil society organizations began to exert 
pressure for recognition of their right to participate directly in the formation 
of global policy. And, indeed they did participate in a much larger (if still 
unofficial and indirect) way than in the past. For example, all of the big the-
matic United Nations conferences held during the 1990s (Environment 
(1992); Human Rights, (1993); Population (1994); Social Summit (1995); 
Women (1995)) included robust parallel proceedings attended by thousands 
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of civil society representatives. These occasions gave civil society enhanced 
opportunities to influence inter-governmental debate and negotiations, en-
gage in networking activities, and through accessing the media impact world 
public opinion. Symbolic of civil society's new status, the United Nations 
Secretary General capped this decade of participation in the year 2000 by 
inviting representatives of civil society to United Nations Headquarters for a 
Millennium NGO Forum, the purpose of which was to be an advisory fore-
runner to the Millennium Assembly of States. 
Fortunately, the energy of global civil society could not be contained 
solely within the institutional confines established by global officialdom. 
Most dramatically, this activism spilled out into the streets of Seattle during 
the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference when over 40,000 citizens protested 
the WTO's undemocratic procedures and policies in what came to be dubbed 
the Battle of Seattle. Other similar protests soon followed whenever and 
wherever those at the helm of the global system of economic governance 
were to meet, particularly the gatherings of the World Bank, WTO, IMF, and 
G-7. 
As the first decade of economic globalization drew to a close in 2001, 
civil society itself channeled this energy into the founding of the World So-
cial Forum as, at least in part, a symbolic counterweight to the World Eco-
nomic Forum, the politically formidable and neoliberally oriented organiza-
tion of business and political elites. In the years since the founding of the 
World Social Forum tens of thousands of representatives of diverse elements 
of civil society have met regularly in Porto Alegre and other non-Western 
cities in the hopes of advancing their varied agendas. 
Paradoxically, despite all of the concern about global citizen participation 
voiced during this era, few observers gave consideration to whether a demo-
cratic role for citizens should and could be formally institutionalized within 
the international system. By 1997 we had come to conclude that thinking 
about global democracy had not kept pace with the new democratic and in-
ternationalist realities of the era. In particular, we believed that the times 
provided an opening for considering whether the central institution of na-
tional democracies - a popularly elected assembly or parliament - could 
be adapted to the global system. From our first Op Eds published in the pop-
ular press, to our later academic works, our goal for the writings contained in 
this book, has not been merely to provide a conceptual or normative analysis, 
but to contribute concretely to global democracy by making a politically 
compelling case for the institution of a popular assembly. 
What had started as an ambitious proposal offered in 1997 during a time 
of great enthusiasm for democratization and internationalism became far 
more difficult to realize in 2001 following the contested election of George 
W. Bush as the new U.S. President and eight months later the attacks of Sep-
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tember 11th. As al Qaeda became the most visible image of a non-
governmental organization, the dramatic rise of civil society in the 1990s 
was to a great extent eclipsed by the revival of statist security concerns in the 
United States and elsewhere. Bowing to statist pressure, for example, the 
large participatory conferences held under UN auspices were largely phased 
out. As the reader will notice, our writings of this period respond to a politi-
cal context where the loudest voices were those calling for what the Penta-
gon named the 'long war' and visions of global inclusion were for many 
people overcome by a Hobbesian mood of fear and tension, a dangerous 
development in a world where access to weapons of mass destruction was 
being universalized. 
Though the last decade has been a difficult one for the global democracy 
movement, it has emerged with its fundamental goals and aspirations very 
much intact. Beneath the public radar of what may dominate the headlines of 
the day, the democratizing movement has continued to make impressive 
strides. In the academic world global democracy has become an important 
subfield of international relations and political theory. Leading scholars of 
cosmopolitan democracy such as Daniele Archibugi and David Held are 
cited far and wide, I and many others have contributed to working out the 
theory and practice of how application of democracy to the global order can 
extend beyond the liberal emphasis on elections and the rule of law? During 
this period ideas have been developed, pondered over, and refined. For ex-
ample, the reader of this volume will notice an evolution in our own thinking 
I For some of their representative works, see Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for 
a New World Order (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995); Daniele Archibugi, The 
Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (2008). 
2 For one of many additional important works within the cosmopolitan democracy school 
see, Raffaele Marchetti, GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: FOR AND AGAINST: ETHICAL THEORY, INSTITU-
TIONAL DESIGN AND SOCIAL STRUGGLE (2008). 
Many other scholars writing in the global democracy subfield have focused on the spe-
cific question of the extent to which intergovernmental organizations can be made more trans-
parent and accountable to governments and other stakeholders. For two often cited and im-
portant works see, e.g., Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of 
Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29-43 (2005); Robert O. Keohane, Global 
Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF Gov-
ERNANCE 130, 130-59 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003). 
Other scholars have focused on participation by civil society organizations and epistemic 
networks in the international system. For some of the more influential works on participation 
by civil society organizations see, MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKfNK, ACTIVIST 
BEYOND BORDERS (1998); Jessica T. Mathews, Powershi/t, FOREIGN AFF., JAN.lFEB. 1997, at 
50; JACKIE SMITH, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR GLOBAL DEMOCRACY (2008). While the impact of 
civil society networks on global governance has been the topic of considerable discussion, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter's consideration of their melding with inter-governmental networks has 
probably been most influential. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER. A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
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from our early endorsement of a parliament or assembly created by civil 
society to our later advocacy of an interstate treaty created parliament. 
This is not to say that there yet exists an academic consensus supportive 
of the need for and desirability of a global parliament or even with respect to 
democratic global reforms in general. Andrew Moravcsik, for example, in 
the title of a provocative article asks the question, Is There a 'Democratic 
Deficit' in World Politics?3 He concludes that, at least with regard to the 
European Union, the answer is in the negative, and other international spe-
cialists remain similarly skeptical that global democracy is emergent or a 
natural sequel to domestic democracy.4 Though there may not be agreement 
about answers or even questions, it is certainly the case that the academic 
debate about global democracy has been joined and is likely to continue, and 
perhaps will even intensify. 
Likewise, civil society has sustained its efforts to overcome the interna-
tional system's democratic deficit, and a determined, if somewhat inchoate, 
movement for global democracy continues to evolve. Important players in 
that movement such as the Montreal International Forum,s founded in 1998, 
and Building Global Democracy,6 founded in 2008, have established them-
selves as inclusive big tents by broadly defining their missions as advancing 
the cause of global democracy generally. In contrast, the focused purpose of 
the four year old Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembl/ is 
to establish the institution of a parliament within the United Nations system. 
Under the leadership of its Secretary General, Andreas Bummel, the Cam-
paign has obtained the backing of hundreds of parliamentarians from coun-
tries around the world. 
Looking To The Future 
As this book goes to press in the second decade of the 21 st century the world 
is again changing, this time in ways that may portend future progress in the 
struggle for global democracy. As when we first began our parliament pro-
3 Andrew Moravcsik, Is there a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics?: A Framework 
/01' Analysis, 39 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 336 (2004). 
4 See Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo, Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing 
Multilateralism, 63 INT'L ORG. I (2009); Philip Pettit, Two-Dimensional Democracy, National 
and International, (N.Y.U. Sch. L. lnst. for lnt'! L. & Just., Working Paper No. 2005/8, 2005), 
available at http://www.iilj.orglpublications/2005-8Pettit.asp. 
5 http://www.fimcivilsociety.org/. 
6 http://www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org/. 
7 http://www.unpacampaign.org/. 
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ject in the 1990's, democracy is again on the march. This time, it is the in-
spiring Arab Spring revolts that stand as testament to an expanding consen-
sus among the world's citizens that societies should be democratically consti-
tuted. Likewise, as in the 1990's, the trend is toward internationalism. In 
particular, in contrast to the period following 9/11, the United States is less 
likely to commit its oversized diplomatic weight to steadfastly opposing 
global solutions to the world's common problems. Perhaps of even more 
fundamental importance to the future of internationalism, the world seems 
headed toward an era where power will be more evenly balanced between 
the United States, the European Union and Japan and such rising regional 
and global actors as China, India, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. 
It is the meeting of these revitalized trends toward democracy and inter-
nationalism with the ever growing practical need for democratic reforms of 
the global order that gives us the greatest confidence that the future may be 
conducive to global democracy. While globalization continues to integrate 
the world's economies, the international system has exhibited its inability to 
respond well to the greatest period of financial instability since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. And, even more distressing, existing institutions of 
global governance have shown themselves unable to deal effectively with 
either of the apocalyptic challenges of global warming and the possession 
and proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. While 
various interests may promote schemes to give the international system au-
thoritarian powers to deal with these challenges, such schemes are not moral-
ly acceptable nor, for that matter, are they likely to be problem-solvers. In a 
world where the democratic spirit is increasingly taking hold, citizens are 
not likely (short of force) to accept despotically imposed solutions to conten-
tious global issues. 
By this assessment we do not wish to understate the significant obstacles 
that remain to galvanizing a critical mass of support for a global parliament. 
Certainly, many powerful institutions of the global order perceive such a 
body as contrary to their interests. Even certain civil society organizations 
(including some proponents of increased civil society access to global insti-
tutions) seem to perceive a need to guard jealously their claim to the mantle 
of voice of the global citizenry from being taken over by the seemingly supe-
rior claim to representativeness of a popularly elected body. Likewise, many 
democratic governments seem far from enthusiastic about relinquishing a 
portion of their current control over global political institutions and proce-
dures to a popularly elected chamber that might favor policies that are at 
odds with their own preferences. Perhaps most paradoxical are the evolving 
attitudes toward a global parliament by the world's non-democracies. Cer-
tainly most absolutist rulers would rather not be forced into choosing be-
tween the reputational costs of precluding their citizens from participating in 
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global elections and the political threat of acceding to the introduction of 
democratic practices into their countries. On the other hand, many of the 
world's constitutional oligarchies, such as China, appear to be gradually 
warming to the possibility that a globally representative institution could 
help break the West's disproportionate influence over global institutions 
without necessarily threatening their internal political structures. 
Beyond the difficulty of negotiating the labyrinth of formidable institu-
tional interests is the challenge of popular appeal. Can the theoretical case for 
a global parliament be formulated so that it resonates widely with the peoples 
of the world and their leaders? To be sure the nature of the project does not 
easily lend itself to a simple mobilizing message such as that put out by the 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court's: the Milosevics of the world 
should not be allowed to get away with it, or the Campaign to Ban Land-
mines', children should not lose their limbs to landmines. In addition, any 
message with a hope of reaching a large audience must be responsive to the 
worldview of a global public that vacillates between the poles of universal-
ism and tribalism, and that, while generally preferring democracy to tyranny, 
is often made cynical about electoral politics by corruption in domestic de-
mocracies and by economic priorities that do not favor the common person. 
Finally, many in positions of global influence who understand the need for 
global democratic reform and a global parliament have not freed their politi-
cal behavior from deference to short-term priorities, believing that their fu-
ture depends on resolving current crises, rather than bringing about long term 
structural change. 
Despite these challenges, we continue to believe as strongly in the democ-
racy project to which this book is devoted as we did when we began in 1997. 
The proposal for a global parliament - as we emphasize repeatedly in the 
chapters that follow - is not utopian. Indeed, since the 18th Century the 
forward march of the democracy idea has consistently beat the odds in trans-
forming country after country. There is no law of political nature which says 
democratic change cannot come as well to the international system. Today, 
as the publishers of this book, the Committee for a Democratic United Na-
tions, and the International Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly 
stand as testament to, much of the organizational infrastructure is in place. 
What awaits is for a critical mass of those who continue to believe in the 
twin values of democracy and internationalism to mobilize behind this pro-
ject. It is to these as yet dormant persons that we address this book in the 
fervent hope of awakening their latent sense of mission. 
